Connections During Democratic Transitions: Insights from the Political Purge in Post-WWII France
With T. Aidt & P.-G. Méon · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026
This paper examines how connections influenced transitional justice during France's post-WWII democratic transition. Analyzing 17,589 documents, we find that law graduates had a 10 to 14 percentage point higher acquittal rate. Indirect connections enabled information transmission to judges, shaping the outcomes of the purge.
With K. Mitchener & K. Oosterlinck · Economic Journal · 2026
We develop a theoretical framework examining sequential interdependent secessions. Using state bonds to assess uncertainty and economies of scale in slaveholding states' 1860s U.S. secession decisions, we show that financial markets priced in both strategic interdependence and the costs of staying in or leaving the union.
The Church as Arbiter: A Divided Right in Interwar France
With C. Boix · Journal of Politics · 2026
We leverage Pope Pius XI's 1926 condemnation of L'Action Française to document the impact of elite actors on political movements. The papal condemnation reshaped AF's territorial distribution, transforming it from a conservative nationalist organization to an extreme antiparliamentarian one.
Ballots instead of Bullets? The Effect of the Voting Rights Act on Political Violence
Jean Lacroix · Journal of the European Economic Association · 2023
This paper investigates the effects of enfranchisement on political violence using the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a natural experiment. VRA coverage halved the incidence and the onset of political violence, as voting became an institutionalized means of expressing political preferences.
Political Dynasties in Defense of Democracy: The Case of France's 1940 Enabling Act
With P.-G. Méon & K. Oosterlinck · Journal of Economic History · 2023
We analyze the parliamentary vote on Marshal Pétain's enabling act in July 1940. Members of democratic dynasties were more likely, by a margin of between 7.6 and 9.0 percentage points, to oppose the act than other representatives, suggesting that inherited democratic commitment shaped behavior at a critical juncture.
Democratic Transitions Can Attract Foreign Direct Investment: Effect, Trajectories, and the Role of Political Risk
With P.-G. Méon & K. Sekkat · Journal of Comparative Economics · 2021
A panel study of 115 developing countries from 1970 to 2014 finds that consolidated democratic transitions increase FDI inflows. Improvements appear after roughly ten years and are partially offset early on by heightened political risk.
Steam Democracy Up! Industrialization-Led Opposition in Napoleonic Plebiscites
Jean Lacroix · European Review of Economic History · 2018
Using a dataset of Napoleonic plebiscites (1852–1870), this paper examines industrialization's role in support for democracy. Doubling industrial employment would decrease autocracy support by 2.5–5.0 percentage points, consistent with theories linking economic modernization to democratic mobilization.